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Strong Customer Authentication: where are we now? | The Paypers

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"To understand this let’s take an analogy. Imagine that SCA in face to face commerce had been mandated on banks, but no technological solution was provided. Instead of chip and PIN each bank created its own solution such that every time a consumer approached a PoS device the authentication method they used would be dependent on which bank they chose to interact with. Can we imagine the confusion on adoption day? But this is, in essence, the experience that has been regulated into existence with PSD2 in on-line commerce. The problem is even worse for third-parties trying to build a business using the PSD2 APIs – because in the middle of their smooth, optimised customer journey their customers are redirected to a bank SCA experience which can vary dramatically in terms of friction and user experience.

To solve this the regulators need to take a step back, temporarily drop anti-competition laws and insist that banks come up with a minimum standard for SCA in online commerce, such that consumers know what to expect and third-parties aren’t disadvantaged by variable SCA experiences."

From "Strong Customer Authentication: where are we now? | The Paypers".

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