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Decentralized Blacklistable Anonymous Credentials with Reputation

In their recent paper "Decentralized Blacklistable Anonymous Credentials with Reputation", Yang et al put forward another way to do this.

When a user wants to access a service of a SP, he first gets the latest requirement of the SP from the ledger, then he checks its validity and whether he satisfies it. If both tests are passed, he then proves to the SP that he satisfies its requirement.

The proof itself can of course be stored on the ledger as well - you may need, for example, to show that someone was indeed age-checked before they were served alcohol.

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